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Beth Van Schaack*
This Article will attempt to make the case for the domestic civil action in
defense of international human rights in the face of a potential threat to such
litigation. It starts with a discussion of the importance of civil redress for
human rights victims and then recounts developments in the area of private
international law that threatens these domestic civil enforcement measures.
Until very recently, impunity for human rights violations and international
crimes has been the general rule in the international community, with few
exceptions. It is clear that only a small proportion of those who commit human
rights offenses are ever brought to justice in a court of law. Some perpetrators
are insulated by blanket amnesties erected in the wake of a transition to
democracy, while others benefit from general government complicity and
inaction. It is axiomatic that this pervasive impunity is probably the most
important factor in the recurrence of such abuses.
Recently, a great deal of attention has focused on efforts at the interna-
tional level to establish institutions to end this culture of impunity and ensure
some measure of accountability for human rights violations. These efforts
include the establishment of the two ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the future establishment of the permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), and renewed interest in the establishment of a
hybrid institution to try members of the Khmer Rouge for the international
crimes committed in Cambodia in the 1970s. However, even when these
institutions are fully operational at the international level, domestic enforce-
ment mechanisms will continue to play a vital role in the promotion of
international human rights norms. International institutions, by necessity and
by design, are capable of addressing only a limited number of perpetrators and
conflicts. The jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals, such as those established to
respond to the crises in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is limited
substantively, temporally, and geographically. Likewise, a fundamental pillar
of the ICC statute is the principle of complementarity, which provides that the
future Court will operate only when the domestic court with jurisdiction is
unable or unwilling to go forward with prosecutions. In all fora, prosecutions
at the international level will probably be limited to those individuals
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commanding and controlling large-scale abuses and to individuals committing
the most serious violations of international humanitarian law. Thus, in order
to address comprehensively this problem of impunity, national systems must be
prepared to take action against human rights abusers within their jurisdictional
reach. National legal systems may respond in a variety of ways to the presence
of human rights abusers within their territories or subject to their jurisdictional
reach. These include criminal prosecutions, often according to the principle of
universal jurisdiction, administrative remedies, and civil redress. No one
mechanism is sufficient, and human rights advocates must strive for the
creation of a coordinated and multifaceted national response to the problem of
impunity.
Europe has witnessed a resurgence in domestic criminal proceedings
initiated against human rights abusers not seen since the close of World War II.
Many of these cases have been brought on the basis of the principle of universal
jurisdiction, as the events in question usually occurred extraterritorially and
involved non-nationals. A leading example is found in the Pinochet proceed-
ings, but prosecutions of individuals accused of committing international crimes
during the conflicts in Latin America, Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere have
been commenced in almost every European state, including Austria, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland. Additionally, many
countries have enacted domestic statutes specifically authorizing the exercise
of universal jurisdiction over individuals accused of perpetrating grave
international crimes. The typical remedy of a criminal proceeding is the
incarceration of other punishment of the perpetrator. At the same time, civil
reparations for the victim in the form of a money judgment may be available
through the criminal law system in civil law countries that have adopted the
partie civile system.
In contrast to these exciting developments in Europe, criminal proceedings
enforcing international human rights norms in the United States are almost non-
existent despite the legal authorization, and indeed the obligation to criminally
punish human rights abusers within this country. In 1994, the United States
enacted federal legislation providing for the prosecution of torturers found
within its borders pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction espoused
in the Torture Convention. To date, however, the United States has declined
to initiate criminal proceedings under this statute, despite credible and
corroborated evidence of the presence of torturers here.
In addition to criminal prosecutions, states may respond to human rights
abusers with administrative measures. These remedies usually relate to an
accused's right to enter or remain in a particular country and include exclusion,
deportation, denaturalization, or revocation of visa rights. For example, after
staging a few largely unsuccessful prosecutions of World War II defendants,
Canada reevaluated its strategy in 1995, and thereafter adopted a practice of
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deporting non-Nazi perpetrators from the country, rather than criminally
prosecuting them.
Individuals seeking admission into the United States either as refugees,
asylees, or in other capacities must disclose their military service and answer
a series of questions relating to past criminal behavior. Unfortunately, these
filters are not as fine as one would hope. For example, one United States
forum asks candidates if they ever committed a crime of "moral turpitude." The
form fails, however, to proffer specific questions about the candidate's
involvement in the torture or persecution of others. If individuals misrepresent
their past on an immigration form, they may be subject to administrative
remedies, such as deportation, or they may face criminal prosecution for fraud.
Earlier this year, Senator Leahy of Vermont sponsored legislation approved by
the Senate and designed to strengthen administrative remedies by empowering
the Office of Special Investigations of the Department of Justice to investigate
and prosecute modem day war criminals and human rights violators present in
the United States.
Such administrative responses have the benefit of providing victims of
human rights abuses with a genuine safe haven in their country of refuge.
However, these measures may ultimately prove unsatisfactory to victims
because they provide only a limited degree of punishment or accountability.
Further, such proceedings take place in closed hearings that do not afford
victims an opportunity to present their claims in a court of law or see justice in
action. And they do not assign individual liability or provide victims with
reparations.
This brings us to civil suits within domestic courts. This may seem strange
to some observers, but every international crime - such as the crime of genocide
or torture - is also a tort. Human rights abuses manifest this dual character as
both crimes and torts because they harm both human society generally and
individual victims. The commission of a tort can give rise to a civil proceeding
by the victim against the tortfeasor, and the principle remedy is a money
judgment for the victim against the perpetrator.
In the United States, civil cases against human rights abusers have been
pursued with consistency over the last two decades by organizations such as:
the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York and The Center for Justice &
Accountability in San Francisco. Many of these cases manifest a form of civil
universal jurisdiction, in that, personal jurisdiction over the defendant is
obtained wherever he may be found. These civil cases have the benefit of
involving the victim directly in the legal process. The victim chooses to initiate
the proceeding and then plays a central role throughout. This is in contrast to
a criminal trial, at least in the United States and other common law countries,
in which the victim plays a secondary role as witness for the prosecution
against the defendant.
2000]
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Those of us who represent victims of human rights violations have found
that this active and direct participation within the legal system is empowering
and often restores a sense of justice for victims of grave human rights abuses
for whom the courts of their countries provided no recourse. Civil cases can
also be commenced where the government is unwilling to act against abusers
within a particular country, as is currently the situation in the United States.
The remedy provided by a civil suit is money damages. The theory behind tort
damages is that they return the plaintiff to the place he or she was prior to the
commission of the tort. In the context of a case seeking to enforce human
rights norms, a money judgment is clearly no equivalent to the harm suffered
by the victims of human rights violations; something fundamental has been
taken from them. However, money damages may begin to compensate the
victim for the pain, emotional distress, and bodily harm suffered, as well as, for
medical expenses, and lost wages, and earning potential. In some common law
systems, punitive or exemplary damages can also be awarded to reflect the
willful or wanton nature of the defendant's conduct and to contribute to the
deterrence of future tortfeasors.
There are some limitations to such suits. First, during the pendency of the
suit, the defendant is not detained in any fashion, which may raise security
concerns for the plaintiffs. Further, in most countries, the defendant can leave
the country despite the filing of a suit against him. Thus, there is no guarantee
that the proceedings will be adversarial in nature, and the plaintiff may end up
with a default judgment in her favor without a detailed articulation of the full
scope of her rights under international law. The most vexing limitation of civil
suits relates to the difficulty of enforcing any resultant judgment. Cases
brought in the United States have been plagued by a lack of enforcement,
because defendants may not hold assets here or they may secrete their assets
abroad during the pendency of the suit. Further, a money judgment may be
difficult to enforce overseas. There is no worldwide enforcement regime in
place. As a result, the enforcement of foreign judgments is largely a matter of
comity and reciprocity.
Several years ago, the United States initiated an effort on the international
level to create a worldwide system aimed at the universal enforcement of
foreign judgments in exchange for the rigid regulation of the exercise of juris-
diction. As will be explained, this system raises large stakes for civil human
rights litigation in domestic courts. Delegates from the international commu-
nity are in the process of drafting a Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters under the auspices of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. The proposed Convention will
govern all "civil and commercial matters" within the national courts of
signatory countries brought against defendants domiciled in another signatory
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country. As such, the Convention would apply to civil suits by human rights
victims and civil judgments for reparations obtained through criminal trials.
The Convention seeks to regulate two areas of private international law:
the exercise of jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments. The
latter aspect of the Convention, dealing with the enforcement of foreign
judgments, holds the potential to greatly benefit civil human rights suits by
providing a mechanism for the automatic enforcement of judgments in the
jurisdictions in which defendants have assets. However, the former aspect of
the Convention -dealing with the exercise ofjurisdiction - may actually hinder,
and under some circumstances eliminate, civil suits seeking to enforce human
rights norms. As the Convention was originally drafted, the default jurisdic-
tional rule was found in draft Article 3, which provided that suits could be
brought in the jurisdiction in which the defendant resides. Draft Article 10 was
a claim specific rule governing cases in tort. According to this rule, a suit
sounding in tort could also be brought in the forum in which the tortious
activity occurred. Article 20 outlined a series of prohibited bases of
jurisdiction and included two important bases of jurisdiction for plaintiffs
seeking to enforce international human rights norms: doing business jurisdic-
tion and transient jurisdiction. The former allows for plaintiffs to bring suit in
a jurisdiction in which the defendant engages in "systematic and continuous"
activities, even if the defendant is not a resident in the jurisdiction. The latter
allows for plaintiffs to bring suit in any forum in which the defendant is present,
so long as the process is properly served while the defendant is in the forum.
Under the original jurisdictional system, victims of human rights abuses
seeking civil redress would have had two options available to them: suing in
the state in which the defendant resides or suing in the state in which the harm
occurred. Thus, these provisions would have entirely foreclosed the application
of universal jurisdiction in the civil context. These original provisions failed
to reflect the fact that many human rights cases before national courts are
brought outside of the state in which the harm occurred or in which the
defendant resides. The vast majority of grave international law violations occur
in states that are experiencing political upheaval or are governed by authorities
who themselves are responsible for the commission of, are complicit in, or are
otherwise indifferent to such violations. Further, perpetrators of human rights
violations may benefit from a blanket amnesty that precludes criminal and civil
trials. As such, domestic courts in these states may be unable or unwilling to
proceed effectively against perpetrators or to provide victims with redress.
In order to ensure their safety, many victims of human rights abuses have
had to flee the state in which the harm occurred, such that it may be impossible
for them to return to that state in order to pursue their rightful claims. They
may even be refugees as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Requiring
the victim to return to their country of persecution in order to seek redress
Schaack2000].
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clearly convenes the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention and the
international law principle of non-refoulement.
Given these unfortunate realities, in order to seek civil redress, such
victims must be able to access the courts of other nations when a human rights
violator travels abroad. Articles 3, 10, and 20 as originally drafted would have
barred this. Further, the proposed Convention could have prevented the
enforcement of civil judgments arising out of criminal'trials ifjurisdiction were
premised on the principle of universal jurisdiction, which was effectively
prohibited by the proposed Convention.
In this way, the original draft of the proposed Convention could have
extinguished efforts by certain states to enforce international human rights
norms through civil litigation in their national courts and foreclosed efforts to
develop similar avenues for redress elsewhere. This would have significantly
stymied efforts by states to fulfill specific conventional and customary
international law obligations to prevent, punish, or remedy international law
violations. Many international human rights conventions, such as the Torture
Convention and the two International Covenants, oblige states parties to provide
victims of abuses with a meaningful remedy, access to the judiciary, and
monetary reparations. If the Convention were ratified as it was then drafted,
signatories would arguably have been in breach of these conventional
provisions. This is especially alarming given the lack of available international
and regional fora for individual victims of human rights abuses.
Fortunately, attorneys and advocates representing victims of human rights
abuses became aware of the implications of this Convention to cases seeking
to enforce human rights norms in domestic courts and sounded the alarm among
other members of the human rights community. These concerned individuals
formed a "Human Rights Coalition" to participate in the drafting process of the
Convention and lobby delegates to include language excluding human rights
provisions from the more restrictive aspects of the Convention's jurisdictional
regime. Negotiations of the Hague Conference on Private International Law on
the draft Convention were held most recently in October 1999 in preparation
for a final Diplomatic Conference in 2000. Going into the negotiations,
members of the Coalition had secured a bracketed "placeholder" that suggested
an exception for civil suits seeking to enforce human rights norms. However,
this placeholder did not provide any details regarding the scope of the
exception. Fortunately, the negotiation session resulted in considerable
progress, although additional work is necessary.
The debate began with the submission from the Human Rights Coalition
that proposed that the following language be inserted in Article 20:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent a party from bringing an action
in a national court seeking relief for a violation of international
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human rights or international humanitarian law that amounts to
criminal conduct under either international or national law, or for
which a right to reparation is established under either international
law or national law. International law shall be interpreted with
reference to the sources of international law identified in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.'
In drafting this language, members of the Coalition were mindful of two
considerations. On the one hand, we wanted to keep the language as broad as
possible in order to allow for the evolution of norms under international law.
At the same time, however, we were cognizant of the fact that delegates would
balk if the exception swallowed the rule. Thus, we drafted the text so that the
exception would apply only to conduct that rose to the level of a crime under
international law. We also suggested that courts look to international and
domestic law to determine which norms have attained this status.
In the ensuing debate, some delegates were concerned that this proposal
remained overly vague and broad. In response, another proposal was put
forward that enumerated a few crimes that would activate the exception and
required future plaintiffs to demonstrate exposure to a risk of a denial ofjustice,
because proceedings in other states are not possible or could not reasonably be
required. Other delegates insisted that this short list of crimes would prove to
be too limiting over time and disallow normative evolution. A third proposal
was advanced that enumerated three general categories of crime - genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity - in keeping with the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ICC Statute.
China introduced a fourth proposal that would trigger the exception only
if the state exercising jurisdiction was acting in accordance with an interna-
tional treaty to which it is a party. Other delegates countered that the Conven-
tion' s exception should be triggered by a violation of customary international
law norms, as well as by treaty violations, in order to address the patent
inequalities created by the fact that not every state has enacted the necessary
implementing legislation for the treaties they have signed.
By the end of the session, the Drafting Committee had consolidated these
proposals into the following draft text to be located in Article 20:
4. Nothing in this article shall prevent a court in a Contracting State
from exercising jurisdiction under national law in an action [seeking
relief] [claiming damages] in respect of conduct which constitutes:
[Variant One:
1. Proposal presented at Debate for Human Rights Coalition for Article 20 (1999-2000).
20001
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genocide, a crime against humanity, or a war crime [as defined
in the statute of the International Criminal Court]; or a serious crime
against a natural person under international law; or
a grave violation against a natural person of non-derogable
fundamental rights under international law, such as torture, slavery,
forced labor and disappeared persons]. [Sub paragraphs [(b) and (c)]
above apply only if the party seeking relief is exposed to a risk of a
denial ofjustice because proceedings in another state are not possible
or cannot reasonably be required.]
[Variant Two:
A serious crime under international law, provided that that state
has established its criminaljurisdiction over that crime in accordance
with an international treaty to which it is a party and that the claim is
for civil compensatory damages for death or serious bodily injury
arising from that crime.]2
The fact that the entire provision is not in brackets is a welcome develop-
ment in that it indicates that a human rights exception will be included within
the final text, although this could theoretically be re-opened at the final
Diplomatic Conference in 2000.
However, this language does include some limitations. First, Variant 2 is
unacceptable for the reasons discussed above, and some version of Variant 1
must be adopted. However, the Convention should not require proof that
proceedings in another state are not possible. This has never been a prerequi-
site to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Further, plaintiffs should not bear
the burden of trying to bring suit in various other jurisdictions when the fcrum
in which the defendant is found can exercise jurisdiction under the universality
principle. Second, the crimes that trigger the exception should not be defined
with reference to the Statute of the ICC. The subject matter jurisdiction of the
future ICC is limited to the most serious international crimes. As such, these
definitions include high thresholds of applicability in order to exclude smaller-
scale and isolated crimes from the ICC's jurisdiction. It is crucial that some
exceptional language along the lines of a modified Variant 1 be included within
the Convention text to protect cases seeking to enforce international human
rights norms from these restrictive jurisdictional provisions. This will ensure
that victims of human rights violations who lack access to the courts of the state
in which the harm occurred are not denied legal redress, and that perpetrators
who are immune from suit in their home countries can be held accountable for
their violations of international law wherever they can be found. These minor
modifications will ensure that the Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments
reflects the fact that human rights litigation is qualitatively different from
2. Drafting Committees consolidation of Section 4 for Article 20 (1999-2000).
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commercial or tort litigation, and that it is inappropriate to subject these vastly
disparate types of cases to a uniform set of jurisdictional rules. Further, the
Convention will actually advance the cause of human rights by providing a
uniform enforcement mechanism that will ensure the enforcement ofjudgments
arising out of civil suits seeking to enforce human rights norms.
International human rights law is composed of a litany of rights that are
fundamental to our sense of fairness and justice. However, if these rights are
to be meaningful, the law must enforce them and provide a meaningful redress
to victims. Civil suits in domestic courts play an important role in this process.
A court judgment denouncing a human rights violation, identifying a responsi-
ble individual, and providing reparations can go a long way toward restoring a
victim's sense of justice. Further, an enforceable damage award can assist the
rehabilitation of victims of human rights abuses who must restart their lives in
their countries of refuge. Unless wrongful conduct is addressed in some official
and public capacity, violations will be repeated with impunity. For these
reasons, it is imperative that the proposed Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters enables, rather than
disables, civil suits seeking redress for grave human rights violations.
2000]
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